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 1 
Effect of Best Management Practices on the Performance and Productivity 
of Small Firms 
 
Abstract 
Recent research on productivity finds that best management practices are a crucial but 
neglected element in explaining firm productivity. This stream of research also focuses on why 
a large number of firms may not implement best management practices despite their apparent 
benefits. In this paper, we examine the adoption of best management practices in small 
leveraged buyout (LBO) firms. Our choice of small LBO is motivated by the fact that these 
firms undergo extensive restructuring and therefore there is an opportunity to study the 
adoption process of best management practices. The findings show that buyout companies 
introduce best management practices (operations, monitoring, targets and incentives related 
practices) at different stages of their development, and more importantly, these practices evolve 
in response to changes in various firm-level characteristics. For example, companies 
emphasising cost leadership tend to follow targets and monitoring related practices while firms 
following a differentiation strategy are more likely to implement incentives and operations 
related management practices. Buyout sponsors’ board representatives and new CEO also play 
a critical role in the adoption of these best management practices which are linked to superior 
firm performance, measured as growth in revenues, productivity and return on assets. 
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1. Introduction 
Firms use management practices to direct, support and motivate individuals to perform their 
specific organizational roles. Management practices thus handle a large amount of diverse 
information, mainly taking the form of rules, routines, documentation and formalized structures 
(Child and Mansfield, 1972; Bagnoli and Vedovato, 2014; Centobelli et al. 2017a;). In a recent 
flurry of research, it has been shown that “best” management practices improve firm 
productivity (Aboelmaged, 2014; Hanna and Jackson, 2015). For instance, Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007) and Bloom et al. (2011) examined the role of product market competition, 
among other factors, in determining the degree to which best management practices are adopted 
by firms in the United States, Britain, Germany, and France. They argued that managerial 
practices positively contribute to firm-level productivity, and that these relationships are 
chiefly observed when firms face higher levels of product market competition. The study also 
showed a long tail of poorly managed firms, raising questions about why variations in the 
adoption of best management practices exist in the first place (Durst and Wilhelm, 2012; 
Inkinen, 2016; Massaro et al., 2016). 
In subsequent literature, it was found that external interventions can bring large benefits 
to the firm that is subjected to a field experiment. Bandiera et al. (2011) explained, “… the fact 
that in so many cases firms have managed to increase profits appears at odds with the common 
assumption that firms are pressured by competitive forces to make at least near-competitive 
close-to-optimal choices (p.78).” They attribute the failure of firms to implement such practices 
to high opportunity costs that would be incurred in owners’ time in exploring the expected 
benefits. These concerns also relate to the wider question of what motivate firms to adopt 
productivity-enhancing practices and technologies (Black and Lynch, 2001; Syverson, 2011). 
For example, after exploring the U.S. cement industry, Syverson (2004) found that a higher 
level of productivity is associated with tougher competition and firm-level competition arising 
from the fear of going bankrupt may also increase the managerial effort to perform. 
In this study, we investigate how best management practices evolve in small-scale 
leveraged buyout (LBO) firms in response to various firm-level changes (Cyert and March, 
1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Greiner, 1972). Apparently, Literature is currently very limited 
on understanding how small-scale firms adopt a variety of management practices as they grow 
with the passage of time (Durst and Wilhelm, 2012; Inkinen, 2016). Moreover, the significant 
contributions of small firms in nation’s economy also make it important to explore the best 
management practices of small firms and to understand how these practices impact their 
performance. For example, as firms face new market challenges, demands on their control and 
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coordination mechanisms also grow, resulting in an inability to cope effectively with increasing 
information needs (Williamson, 1971; Edvardsson and Durst, 2014; Durst et al. 2015). Firms 
may respond to these failures by engaging in the process of change, modification and 
revamping of their existing management practices, especially in instances such as when a major 
re-organization occurs. In this paper, we focus on leveraged buyout (LBO) firms because their 
practices are subject to change as the new owners of the firms will likely to have an overt 
interest in implementing various performance improvement measures over the medium to long-
term period. This study investigates both the changes in the configuration of best management 
practices, as well as the motivations and drivers behind these changes. More specifically, we 
ask: whether buyout firms following low cost strategies implement target and monitoring-
related best management practices; whether buyout firms following differentiation strategies 
implement incentives and operations-related best management practices; and, finally, whether 
buyout firms implementing best management practices experience superior performance. 
As evolutionary and adaptive theories predict, firms adopt workplace practices in 
response to an evolving need for minimizing information processing costs as their operations 
grow and expand (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Changes in the firm’s internal and external 
environment may also induce the demand for specific practices (Cyert and March, 1963; Dosi 
and Marengo, 2007; Cerchione and Esposito, 2017; Centobelli et al., 2017b). In past, 
evolutionary and adaptive firm theories have been used in different contexts to explain firm 
practices such as innovation, industry structures, and networks and alliances (Osborn and 
Hagedoorn, 1997; Agarwal et al., 2002; Wright and Zammuto, 2012). For example, Strang and 
Still (2004) state that these two lines of argument are central to sociological treatments of 
organizational diffusion. The Carnegie School’s analysis of decision-making treats 
organizations as boundedly rational adaptive agents engaged in problem-driven search (March 
and Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963). However, institutional studies of organizational 
change argue that firms emulate more legitimate or successful others (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). Together, these ideas provide accounts of the intensity and direction of search. As 
mentioned, the specific context we use is that of small-scale LBO firms. LBO is a form of 
investor activism of public firms that have incurred agency costs beyond an optimal point 
(Kaplan, 1989; Jensen, 1989). LBO are also associated with organizational change and 
development, both in the way a buyout firm’s strategic and organizational context changes and 
how these changes influence its management practices (Cumming et al., 2007; Cornelli and 
Karakas, 2008; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). For instance, most LBO vigorously implement 
a cost cutting strategy as soon as a new management team is put in place. This inward focus 
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gradually shifts to an outward focus when buyout sponsors are nearer the exit from their 
investment, mirroring the need for a more diversified product market strategy1. Such an 
environment lends itself especially well to a study of how changes occur in the firm’s 
management practices. Many new practices are adopted in the event of a breakdown in 
processes such as a failure to meet deadlines or quality problems. It is likely that buyout firms 
actively use best management practices to ameliorate organizational failures that characterize 
pre-buyout firms. By studying these evolutionary adoption processes, we thus advance the 
existing research on both best management practices and the way small-scale firms adopt these 
practices to meet the challenges of growth and competitiveness. The power of knowledge has 
come to be an important resource for organizations to develop expertise, solve problems, 
increase organizational learning, and initiate new situations for both the individual and the 
organization now and in the future (Durst and Wilhelm, 2012; Inkinen, 2016). The amplified 
velocity and dynamic nature of the new economy, partnered by substantial advances in 
technology has created an incentive for many organizations to reconcile and utilize their 
knowledge in order to generate value over a sustained period of time. The effective utilization 
of a firm’s intangible assets have also functioned as catalyst for creating competitive advantage 
over other organizations operating in the market.   
This study contributes to the growing literature on best management practices in three 
important aspects. First, the study investigates the evolution of best management practices over 
time in order to fully understand their adoption process. Assuming management practices are 
reflected in the multitude of activities that a firm engages in, we show how management 
practices evolve as small firms restructure their production or service-related activities. 
According to the evolutionary firm perspective, firm routines develop over time (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982) and, therefore, it is unlikely that the trajectory of ‘best management practice’ 
adoption will be uniform. There will be significant changes in how best management practices 
are adopted as various firm-related behavioural changes come into play at various points in 
time (Cyert and March, 1963; Dosi and Marengo, 2007). This is especially the case when LBO 
firms are engaged in problem-driven search for better organizational and management systems. 
Prior studies not only neglected the issue of  adoption process, but also failed to offer 
convincing explanations of why some firms do not implement best management practices and 
behave in a suboptimal fashion. As organizations must consider a wide variety of technical and 
                                               
1 Leveraged buyouts are normally undertaken by private equity firms who raise specialist funds for the purpose. 
However, since private equity firms also raise funds for dealing with operations such as distressed debt, the 
common industry practice to distinguish between these activities is to call buyout funds as buyout sponsors.  
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human issues when choosing the ‘right’ mix of a knowledge management system in order to 
lever knowledge effectively, the firm’s energy, organizational activity, and investment can 
often lead to ineffective knowledge management initiatives. Second, whereas in the studies 
cited above, ‘competition’ is the only determining factor considered, in this study we 
additionally examine the role of factors such as firm strategies, debt and board composition. In 
this regard, we build our specific hypotheses based on evolutionary organizational learning 
theories that emphasize the critical role of firm-level changes, past and present, in the 
development of specific firm routines, capabilities or workplace practices (Ethiraj and 
Levinthal, 2004). 
Finally, the present research adopts the methodological innovation of investigating 
management practices across firms. Extant management research mainly focuses on 
management practices within firms (Huselid, 1995). This approach is useful to the extent that 
it allows an investigator to research interactions among different sets of management practices. 
However, it does not explicate how different management practices are implemented across 
firms and, therefore, it may not be possible to derive general conclusions about the contribution 
of management practices to productivity. We also investigate the impact of best management 
practices on buyout firm performance. These questions are addressed by analyzing both 
qualitative and quantitative data related to the choice of best management practices by a sample 
of buyout firms. We can therefore establish the links between the various motivations and 
drivers of ‘best management practice’ adoption, and their impacts on productivity. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 critically reviews the literature and develops 
the key hypotheses to be tested in this study. Section 3 discusses the research methodology 
adopted in this study and section 4 presents the analysis and findings. At the end, section 5 
discusses the findings and concludes the paper.  
 
 
 
2. Background research and hypotheses 
This section first discusses and reviews the extant literature in three different areas, including 
leveraged buyouts, evolutionary perspective and specific management practice related 
literature, such as knowledge management and supply chain management. Based on this 
analysis, we then develop our specific hypotheses. 
  
2.1 Managerial Capital: An Evolutionary Perspective 
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Best management practices imply that bad practices can exist along with good practices. A firm 
may begin with good practices but over time some of these practices may degenerate into bad 
practices. If the firm is able to select more good practices than bad practices, then it can benefit 
from a higher level of productivity. The reverse is also true, however, and it is likely that the 
firm will not fully enjoy the fruits of productivity. This suggests that when we conceptualize 
best management practices, we must also contemplate the possibility that a firm is endowed 
with good practices as well as bad practices and that there is an evolutionary process involved 
in selecting best management practices. In other words, it is important to understand the 
adoption process of best management practices. Bouvier and Nisar (2012) describe a firm’s 
current stock of management practices as ‘managerial capital.’ It is thus possible to show that 
a firm may have a higher level of managerial capital compared to other firms or vice versa. 
These ideas are best supported by the evolutionary and behavioral frameworks of Nelson and 
Winter (1982) and Cyert and March (1963). 
 The evolutionary perspective postulates that institutions like firms can be better 
understood by analyzing routines as the building block of productive organizations (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Greiner, 1972). Nelson and Winter (1982) recognized the limitations of the 
individuals to process all relevant information in the workplace and this limitation underpins 
their theory of ‘routines’. As Nelson and Winter (1982: 35) explained that “Man’s rationality 
is ‘bounded’: real-life decision problems are too complex to comprehend and therefore firms 
cannot maximize over the set of all conceivable alternatives. Relatively simple decision rules 
and procedures (i.e. routines) are used to guide action, because of the bounded rationality 
problem these rules and procedures cannot be too complicated.” The motivation for explicating 
routines to understand the nature of the firm draws a great deal on the processes by which the 
firm becomes the repository of knowledge, contingent on the firm’s past history. There can 
also be a number of other factors arising from changes in the firm’s internal and external 
environment such as changes in competition that influence the development of these processes 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Dosi and Marengo, 2007). The knowledge capability pertinent to the 
firm’s operations is accomplished over a period of time, as particular ways of doing things 
become standard practices to be followed by individual employees (Abell et al., 2008; Dosi 
and Marengo, 2007). 
Building on these ideas, extant management literature has generally focused on 
understanding those attributes of management practices that minimize information processing 
costs in different organizational contexts – a process necessary for understanding the evolution 
of best management practices (Eisenhardt, 1985; Herremans, et al. 2011). This study aims to 
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identify the nature and scope of different management practices in adaptive environments. For 
example, when it is difficult to measure performance outcomes or when they are less reliable 
as indicators of a manager’s ‘true’ performance, best management practices may facilitate the 
decision-making process by helping managers to update their beliefs about the choices they 
make and the consequence they receive (Chandler, 1962; Cyert and March 1963).  
In recent literature, attempts have been made to go a step further and classify best 
management practices in terms of a specific set of categories. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) 
examined the degree to which best management practices contribute to firm-level productivity. 
They group management practices into four areas: operations; these are three practices that are 
related to the introduction of lean manufacturing techniques, the documentation of processes 
improvements, and the rationale behind introductions of improvements; monitoring; these are 
five practices that are related to the tracking of performance of  individuals, reviewing 
performance (e.g., through regular appraisals and job plans), and consequence management 
(e.g., making sure that plans are kept and appropriate sanctions and rewards are in place); 
targets; these are five practices that are related to the type of targets (whether goals are simply 
financial or operational or more holistic), the realism of the targets (stretching, unrealistic, or 
nonbinding), the transparency of targets (simple or complex), and the range and 
interconnection of targets (e.g., whether they are given consistently throughout the 
organization), and incentives; these are five practices that are related to promotion criteria (e.g., 
purely tenure-based or including an element linked to individual performance), pay and 
bonuses, and fixing or firing bad performers. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) found support for 
the hypotheses that all the above-mentioned practices are positively related to firm 
productivity. They also found a significant number of poorly managed firms. Bloom et al. 
(2011) suggested that firms may not adopt best management practices due to a number of 
factors. For example, in some circumstances it may be costly to introduce new management 
practices. For the firm implementing new management practices overall impact may be 
negligible as profits remain more or less at the same level even if productivity rises due to the 
improved practice of company management. In some other firms, the separation of control 
from ownership may result in managerial entrenchment, whereby managers stick to those 
practices that require less effort on their part. They may not adopt optimum practices because 
of the difficulty in providing appropriate incentives for doing so. Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) 
also propose the idea of differential costs and/or benefits that exist when implementing best 
management practices. In addition, learning effects and slow adjustments may mean that best 
management practices may not be fully adopted at a point in time, even if the benefits of such 
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practices are obvious. Other factors that may impinge upon the adoption process include capital 
markets, labor market regulations, trade unions and corporate governance (Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2003; Bloom et al., 2011).  
In terms of the management areas where adaptive processes occur more recurrently and 
best management practices as defined by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), a typology of the 
interrelationships between both these areas of interest can be developed (as provided in Table 
1). Next, the question of the firm-related specific factors that might impinge upon the adoption 
of best management practices would be addressed. As discussed above, we focus on LBO type 
firms in order to delineate the determinants of the adoption of best management practices. This 
will also allow us to formulate more specific research hypotheses for our study.     
 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
 
2.2 LBO firms and Best Management Practices 
Buyouts are structured to provide significant equity incentives to the entrepreneurs, together 
with substantial external funding and active monitoring by investors (Jensen, 1993; Wright et 
al., 1994). Buyouts occur with a varying degree of debt-equity ratios but a major part of 
leveraged buyouts is the use of substantial debt for controlling the company. Early research on 
LBO viewed the buyout of public firms as a means of reducing significant agency costs in the 
form of free cash flows (Jensen, 1989; Fox and Marcus, 1992; Halpern et al., 1999). As 
managers’ and shareholders’ interests are not fully aligned, managers sit on huge piles of free 
cash flow and use them as a protection mechanism against downside risk. An LBO curtails this 
inefficient use of firm resources and diverts free cash flows toward debt repayment. LBO also 
represent higher share of insider equity that creates incentives for value maximization through 
its effect on the alignment of interests between shareholders and managers. As LBOs aim to 
create an alignment of interests between owners and managers, they are likely to implement 
best management practices as they have an innate ability to support efficient decision making, 
better resource allocation and utilization and improved monitoring and control. 
 
2.3 Firm Strategy and Best Management Practices 
LBO firms provide a context in which the presumed association between strategy and best 
management practices can be fully investigated. Economics studies researching the adoption 
of best management practices are limited to the factor of competition as a key relevant 
determinant (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al. 2011). However, a stream of 
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management research that investigates different types of management systems and practices 
emphasize the link between company management practices and strategy (Centobelli et al. 
2017a & b; Cerchione and Esposito, 2017). For example, Hill and Hoskisson (1987) and 
Langfield-Smith (1997) investigated the link between strategy and management control 
systems and focus on the relationship between general strategic context of a firm and how it 
influences its control structures. Govindarajan and Fisher (1990) and Snell (1992) examined 
aspects of a firm’s operational strategic contexts such as business-unit level product-market 
variation, work flow integration and organizational size and their effects on firm management. 
Overall, these and other studies draw their inspiration from contingency theories of 
management, according to which management practices are implemented in response to 
specific industry factors. For example, supply chain management practices require particular 
industry focus (Kotzab et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2017).  
LBOs in the 1980s and 1990s were mainly aimed at providing efficiency incentives as 
most buyouts took place in mature and stagnating businesses (Jensen, 1989; Kaplan, 1989; 
Phan and Hill, 1995). While still maintaining this interest in mature industries, recent waves of 
LBO are more likely to be found in growth and emerging industries (Kaplan, 2007; Cumming 
et al., 2007). As a result, it is sometimes argued that LBO act as a vehicle for entrepreneurial 
initiative (Bruining and Wright, 2002) and promote technological innovation and growth 
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). Regardless of the motive for taking a company private, LBO 
create a juncture at which there is an opportunity to reconsider the strategy of a firm and 
streamline its management systems. Buyouts may initially be concerned with enhancing 
efficiency and protecting the firm against downside risks but the subsequent changes can be 
far-reaching and may encompass all aspects of company management (Bruining and Wright, 
2002). From improvements in the quality of information to introducing equity-based incentives 
through to spelling out clear basis for performance measurement can all be part of this change 
program. 
Traditionally, buyout sponsors are concerned with streamlining the operations of their 
portfolio companies to meet performance challenges (Kaplan, 1989, 1991). To bring 
management and production systems into alignment with efficient cost structures, the sponsors 
may take steps such as (1) employing people with high levels of experience and practicing all 
possible economies of scale; (2) producing a standard, undifferentiated product; and (3) giving 
employees targeted incentives. These strategies are underpinned by a standardized production 
system, requiring the performance of a routinized set of tasks. In the lexicon of organization 
theory, when production can be defined in terms of routines and repetitive procedures, the 
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knowledge of ends and means is high, implying high task programmability (Siders et al. 2001; 
Woolley, 2009). Targets-based best management practices may then be implemented to secure 
buyout company manager compliance (Baron et al., 1996). However, when product-market 
variations are greater, with a high degree of breadth and change in the firm’s products or 
markets (Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980; Woolley, 2009), there may be an increasing demand on 
the information-processing capabilities of the firm (Egeihoff, 1982; Beersma, et. al. 2003;). 
There will then be a need for monitoring the structuring of firm’s operations. A buyout is more 
likely to experience these changes when the sponsors seek to prepare their companies for sale. 
An investment will exit on favorable terms if the company’s revenue stream is stable and based 
on better quality products.  
Given the focus on both cost reduction and revenue growth in a buyout, Porter’s (1980) 
strategy framework can be used to construct relevant strategy parameters (Sandino, 2007). 
Porter (1980) views strategy in terms of a trade-off between cost leadership and product 
differentiation. However, empirical research has shown that these generic strategies may be 
linked in a variety of ways (Hill, 1988; Jones and Butler, 1988; Murray, 1988; Bagnoli and 
Vedovato, 2014; Centobelli et al. 2017a), and, therefore, they may not be mutually exclusive. 
Strategy trade-offs are generally about identifying company goals on a continuum between 
companies following a ‘cost leader’ or ‘defender’ strategy and those following a ‘growth-
oriented’ or ‘differentiation’ strategy (Miles and Snow, 1978). In the present context, 
characteristics of a company with a low-cost product strategy match those of a buyout firm’s 
traditional restructuring program while a product differentiation strategy is linked to a buyout 
sponsor’s need to make its investments more attractive in terms of its differential offerings. As 
evolutionary and adaptive theories of organization would suggest (Cyert and March 1963), 
firms following a strategy of cost leadership are more likely to use best management practices 
related to operating targets and monitoring, while firms following differentiation strategies may 
adopt structures and processes that target individual responsiveness to changes in the 
environment. These are more likely to be accomplished by best management practices related 
to operations and incentives. One can argue that these practices meet the evolving demands of 
information and knowledge management as firms grow (Cerchione and Esposito, 2017; 
Centobelli et al. 2017b). Knowledge management and intellectual resources are increasingly 
important factors in the outstanding achievement of organizational objectives (Durst and 
Wilhelm, 2012; Kotzab et al., 2015; Inkinen, 2016; Zhang et al., 2017). Higher levels of 
efficiency mean that knowledge becomes an important source of competitive advantage 
(Centobelli et al. 2017b; Cerchione and Esposito, 2017). This requires organizations to 
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understand the relationships between physical, financial, and intellectual capital to increase 
their market value and to achieve corporate sustainability. Organizations that operate in 
innovation and technology intensive markets place greater emphasis on facilitating and 
maintaining knowledge-sharing cultures that are integrated and supported by a company’s 
employees, its systems and processes, and technology in order to remain competitive (Durst 
and Wilhelm, 2012; Inkinen, 2016). The literature appears to agree that trust and social 
identification are the most widely recognized reasons causing positive effects for knowledge 
sharing. 
The above discussion of the role of best management practices in leveraged buyouts leads us 
to formulate the following specific hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Buyout firms following low cost strategies will implement target and 
monitoring-related best management practices. 
Hypothesis 2: Buyout firms following differentiation strategies will implement incentives 
and operations-related best management practices. 
 
2.4 Best Management Practices and Performance 
Firm’s adoption of best management practices ensures that individuals’ efforts are fully 
directed toward achieving targeted levels of performance (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). 
Similarly, buyout firms implement various sets of best management practices, as identified in 
the previous section, that helps achieve better control and monitoring. One can show that best 
management practices encompass various components of knowledge management that 
enhance the ability of the organizations to perform better and more efficiently and effectively  
(Bagnoli and Vedovato, 2014; Centobelli et al. 2017a). A shared understanding of 
organizational practices will likely engender greater commitment and trust among the group 
workers. It would help provide access to useful information, judgements, and views leading to 
solving difficult problems (Cerchione and Esposito, 2017; Centobelli et al. 2017b). Buyout 
sponsors have a financial claim on the company and as such they are interested in the financial 
success of the enterprise. Hellmann and Puri (2002) argued that the presence of professional 
funding in the company’s financial structure explains significant variation in the level of 
professional management in venture-backed firms. Buyout sponsors are also likely to 
encourage their portfolio companies to restructure their operations so as to achieve improved 
performance. Such a strategy will lead to their exit within a specified timeframe, thus enabling 
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the sponsors to close their funds and return capital to their investors as per contractual terms 
(Kaplan, 1991)2. We therefore examine the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Buyout firms implementing best management practices will experience 
superior performance. 
3. Research design 
In this study, the evolution of best management practices (BMP) in 208 European-based buyout 
companies is examined (see Table 2). The research methodology involves first constructing a 
sample of buyouts for this study. We then develop a detailed testing model, including 
definitions of independent variables and dependent variables. At the time of sampling, 
companies (i) had a minimum of 50 employees, (2) were more than ten years old, and (3) 60 
percent or more debt was used in the buyout transaction. The research methodology adopted in 
this study involves selecting a dataset based on a number of criteria stated. Once admitted into 
the sample, we go back to the genesis of these companies and track the build up of BMP from 
the buyout date to the time of study. The buyout date was obtained from the S&P’s Leveraged 
Commentary & Data (LCD). Because information about company BMP is not readily available 
from public sources, it was necessary to develop our own research instruments for this study’s 
purpose. As a first step, the profile of each company was built by collecting information from 
company web pages and press releases from EBSCO and Lexis-Nexis. From these sources, we 
had enough information about company products, key personnel and company history of 
mergers and acquisitions. These datasets also give reliable information about each European 
country’s institutional and economic environment, thus allowing the selection of buyouts on 
comparable institutional / economic performance indicators. 
As discussed above, LBO firms provide debt discipline to curtail agency costs. However, debt 
leverage used by private equity sponsors has steadily declined after the heady days of buyouts 
of the 1980s (Jin and Wang, 2002; Kaplan, 2007).3 The interviewees suggested that there had 
been an upward movement again in leveraged finance for buyout deals post-2000 when the 
                                               
2 PE sponsors make their investments via LBO funds that have a limited life span of 10-12 years. 
3 In the 1980s and 1990s, apart from a few private equity firms, buyout activity was mostly undertaken by 
European venture capital firms. It was therefore likely that the amount of leverage used in buyout activity was 
less then the one used in U.S-based firms. However, post-2000 a large number of European-based firms have 
raised private equity funds that solely target leveraged-buyout activity. US-based private equity firms have also 
established their offices in several European countries to directly participate in the local buyout market. These 
trends have helped converge buyout practices in both sets of markets. 
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sponsors faced improved financial conditions; but, for the sake of consistency, we selected 
buyout firms with a minimum debt component of 60 percent4. 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
 
 Exploratory interviews with fourteen buyout professionals was the next step to develop 
an initial understanding of the types of best management practices commonly implemented in 
buyout firms. We selected buyout professionals based on their industry reputation; for example, 
if they are members of the venture capital and private equity association. Subsequently, using 
questionnaires and semi-structured interviews the information about key research variables 
were obtained, including information on firm strategy, board structure, and employment of 
professional staff. Moreover, an account of the firm’s best management practices were also 
collected with details about which practices were introduced at various stages of the buyout 
and if they were still in use at the time of the interview. In most cases, the questionnaire was 
completed in face-to-face interviews with either the CEO or the human resource (HR) manager. 
Interviews with each company’s chief financial officer (CFO) and the marketing/product 
development manager were also conducted. The semi-structured interviews with each of these 
four managers generally lasted about an hour, and were used to obtain information about the 
interviewee’s experience with best management practices, from initial design through 
implementation. There are certain limitations of the interview method such as respondents’ 
bias regarding ‘acceptable practices’ or they may be subject to recall bias (Seidman, 1998). To 
mitigate this limitation, various dimensions of a particular variable were included, and 
contrasted their responses to other available information. We obtained financial information 
from Orbis, which is a rich source of information about both public and private companies. 
The data collected were sufficient to gather a large enough variation to examine the hypotheses 
developed in this study. 
The research methodology then entails using Bloom and Van Reenen’s (2007) 
measures of best management practices. An example of scoring grid for each set of 
management practices is provided in appendix 1. The mean score for all items included in a 
scale is used to create value for each one of these scales. To confirm that the variables were 
distributed normally and the actual response patterns were in accordance with expectations, 
different statistical methods including normal probability plots, histograms and factor analysis 
                                               
4 Private equity is also associated with ‘flipping’ their buyout companies in a short space of time. In our 
empirical research, we took care to include only those companies where the investor hold period is more than 
the industry average (Kaplan, 1991). 
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are employed. LBO performance is measured by employing three measures: revenue growth, 
productivity and return on assets (ROA). The choice of the productivity measure was primarily 
because, compared to changes in profitability, changes in productivity are likely to show up 
sooner. Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over total 
labor costs is used to measure labor productivity. The use of total labor costs as denominator 
allows to account for variations among firms’ salary structures. Revenue growth and the change 
in return on assets (ROA), defined as EBITDA/total assets are other performance measures. 
 
3.1 Measurement of Variables 
Both economics and management literatures stress on several important reasons for the 
adoption of best management practices, including agency cost, cost-benefit trajectory of 
decision support systems, strategy and size. In the following section, we develop specific 
variables that are used to examine the extent of variation in the types of best management 
practices adopted by buyout firms. As discussed above, our specific variables are drawn from 
the three strands of the literature that form the basis of our hypotheses. These include buyout 
literature, best management practice literature, including knowledge management and supply 
chain and evolutionary approaches. In defining the variables, we also briefly refer to their 
motivations; in particular, how best management practices contribute to firm-level 
productivity.  
Best management practices: Bloom and Van Reenen’s (2007) measures of best 
management practices, including operations, monitoring, targets and incentives related 
practices is adopted in this study. By using multiple respondents, interrater reliability is ensured 
(measure reliability was 0.66 (p < 0.001)). To confirm control measure dimensionality 
empirically, a principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation is conducted to assess 
convergence within and divergence between scales. Based on this anlayis, four stable factors 
representing operations, monitoring, targets and incentives are derived, each having an 
eigenvalue greater than 1.0 and together accounting for 52 percent of variance in the data. 
Strategy: Extant research identifies business strategy as a relevant key factor in 
explaining cross-sectional variation in the design and implementation of different sets of 
management practices (Hill, 1988; Langfield-Smith, 1997). Chandler (1962) observed that the 
strategic posture of a firm affects the absorption level of its administrative information. In 
addition, knowledge management and intellectual resources have become increasingly 
important factors in the special achievement of organizational objectives (Durst and Wilhelm, 
2012; Inkinen, 2016); higher levels of efficiency mean that knowledge becomes an important 
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source of competitive advantage (Cerchione and Esposito, 2017; Centobelli et al. 2017b). To 
capture the impact of firm strategy on best management practice adoption, two variables; cost 
leadership and differentiation are used. Following Hill (1988) and Sandino (2007), we define 
COSTLEADERSHIP and DIFFERENTIATION as follows5: 
COSTLEADERSHIP is a composite measure that proxies for the firm’s cost leadership 
strategy. It is a principal component measure that captures 73 percent of the variation in two 
questions: (1) the extent to which the firm places an emphasis on lower prices as a way to 
maintain its market position, and (2) the extent to which the firm directs its operations toward 
controlling cost and offering lower priced goods. Using a Likert scale, these questions place 
higher values on strategies emphasizing cost efficiency targets - 7 - and lower values for firms 
indifferent to cost restructuring -1. 
DIFFERENTIATION is a composite measure that proxies for the firm’s differentiation 
strategy. It is a principal component measure that captures 66 percent of the variation in two 
questions: (1) the extent to which the firm offers unique products as a way of extending its 
market reach, and (2) the extent to which the firm emphasizes knowledge growth and capability 
improvement in its revenue-generating operations. As discussed, organizations that operate in 
innovation and technology intensive markets place greater emphasis on facilitating and 
maintaining knowledge management systems and knowledge-sharing cultures that are 
integrated and supported by a company’s employees, its systems and processes (Durst and 
Wilhelm, 2012; Inkinen, 2016). Using a Likert scale, these questions place higher values on 
strategies emphasizing high product differentiation - 7 - and lower values for firms indifferent 
to product improvements -1. 
Board: As a buyout aims to improve company performance by aligning owner-manager 
interests, changes in corporate management will be necessary to strengthen the firm’s 
traditional monitoring function. Due to agency problems, there are severe monitoring 
inadequacies in boards of public firms that cause buyout sponsors to replace passive outsiders 
with active investors (Jensen, 1989). Buyout sponsors may sit on LBO firm boards, and since 
these sponsors often hold majority equity shares in LBO, they are likely to exercise 
considerable influence over company managers (Kaplan, 1991; Holthausen and Larcker, 
1996). Evidence shows that LBO boards are structured to yield strong returns to investors and 
                                               
5 We have earlier noted the limitations of adopting this approach as empirical research suggests that such 
generic strategies may be linked in a variety of ways (Hill, 1988; Jones & Butler, 1988; Murray, 1988), and, 
therefore, they may not be mutually exclusive. Similar to Sandino (2007) and others, we have adopted this 
approach in order to simplify our analysis.  
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thus they represent “value-maximizing” boards (Cornelli and Karakas, 2008; Gertner and 
Kaplan, 1996). To measure the impact of investor involvement in ‘best management practice’ 
adoption, we examine whether buyout investors are part of the company’s board of directors 
(when board does not exist, we ask if the buyout sponsor has appointed a specialist person to 
deal with the portfolio company). Extant literature on best management practices also suggests 
that in some situations external interventions may be necessary to bring about changes in the 
firm’s management practices (Bloom et al., 2011). Board membership (BOARD) is a dummy 
variable updated yearly that takes the value of one if the buyout company has the sponsor’s 
board member and zero otherwise. A measure of debt is also used to examine its impact on the 
adoption of best management practices in a buyout. Debt (DEBT) is the proportion of debt used 
in the LBO transaction. 
 
3.2 Control variables 
The research methodology also includes several control variables that are likely to affect the 
assumed relationship between best management practices and firm-level productivity. A 
number of control variables including buyout managers, competition, size and subsidiary based 
on the literature’s discussion of various relevant factors is used that likely affect LBO 
transactions and their performance impacts. For example, Gabarro (1987) emphasizes the role 
of consultants and chief financial officers in change organizations. 
Buyout managers: The adoption of best management practices will need to consider 
the question of costs and benefits of adding an additional layer of management practice to 
support decision-making. It can be argued that companies with more complex operations will 
adopt management practices that have a more favourable cost-benefit relationship (Simons, 
1994) - it is time-consuming and costly to install and operate best management practices. These 
costs may be related to both the direct, short-term expenditure incurred in developing firm-
related best management practices, but also the indirect, long-term costs associated with 
unsuitable management practices. Given these considerations, one factor that is likely to 
influence the adoption/modification decision is the recruitment of professionals in areas 
directly linked to firm operations. 
When buyout sponsors acquire a new business, they normally appoint top management 
team from outside the firm. It gives company management a break from the past but also a 
mandate to build up the scale of the enterprise that had been underperforming. Buyout 
companies are also driven by the specific management objective of turning around the business, 
which means that they are under significant pressure to improve performance. Gabarro (1987) 
 17 
finds in his field research of change organizations that new managers follow a dual strategy of 
(1) hiring consultants to design and implement new diagnostic control systems, and (2) 
recruiting a new chief financial officer to oversee the monitoring of critical performance 
variables. Similar effects are likely to be observed in buyout firms, and therefore, the impacts 
of new CEO, CFO, HR Manager and Marketing/Business Development Manager on the 
adoption of best management practices is evaluated. It is likely that these managers, having a 
functional background, are motivated to execute operational changes that reflect their own 
professional outlook, including the adoption of best management practices. 
New CEO (CEO) is a dummy variable updated every year that takes the value of one if 
a new CEO has replaced the incumbent CEO, and zero otherwise. The presence of a full-time 
CFO is a time-varying variable that takes the value of one for those years in which the company 
had a full-time finance manager, and zero otherwise. Likewise, a full-time HR Manager (HR 
MANAGER) is a time-varying variable that takes the value of one for those years in which the 
company had a full-time HR manager, and zero otherwise. A similar variable for Marketing / 
Business Development Manager is also used. A full-time Marketing / Business Development 
Manager (BD MANAGER) is a time-varying variable that takes the value of one for those 
years in which the company had a full-time marketing manager, and zero otherwise. The 
information about the date in which a particular officer was hired was gathered from the 
CEO/HR Manager questionnaire. This information was triangulated during the interview when 
the interviewee was asked to describe the relevant functional history of the company. 
Competition: Economics literature on best management practices examines 
competitive environment as a key determining factor of ‘best management practice’ adoption. 
In this research, we also use a similar variable to capture the competitive positioning of the 
firms investigated. We asked our respondents to tell us about the number of direct competitors 
they faced in their particular markets (Minimum 1; Maximum 7). 
Size: Informal contact among employees is the basis on which control and coordination 
occur in relatively small organizational environments. These settings are mostly related to the 
early developmental stages of a company, initiation of a new project or small-scale enterprises. 
With the number of employees increasing, however, it becomes necessary to develop a more 
formalized system of operations that anchors informal contact and communication around a set 
of fully written down and prescribed systems of governance. Controlling and coordinating large 
number of personal interactions inevitably increase the cost of governance (Lorsch and Morse, 
1974). As personal interactions increase disproportionately, the ability of the system to cope 
well is also at risk. Thompson (1967) thus argues that with size the efficiency of an informal 
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control approach rapidly decreases. We measure firm size (SIZE) as the natural logarithm of 
the number of employees working at the end of each year (The logarithmic transformation was 
used to reduce positive skew.)  
It is expected that subsidiary firms, who often are targets of public to private LBO 
transactions, will use best management practices more intensely, given their experience of such 
systems. SUBSIDIARY is a dummy variable that indicates whether the LBO was subsidiary 
of a public firm (1) or not (0). The study also controls for industry. This variable may capture 
some of the differences across firms in terms of their external or product market environments 
(Hambrick, 1983). If the arguments that explain variation among BMP in well-established 
firms are relevant to change environments such as a buyout, then controlling for industrial 
sectors may enhance the power of the research design. For example, firms with more structured 
operations like product assembly may adopt output controls sooner because assembly tasks are 
more amenable to explicit coding compared to less structured operations like product 
development. Five industries are coded using dummy variables: manufacturing, trade, 
telecommunications, health and education, and IT industry. To study the impact of BMP on 
company performance, we use revenue growth, productivity and ROA, as defined above. We 
employ the productivity measure because, compared to changes in profitability, changes in 
productivity are likely to show up sooner. Similarly, the use of total labor costs in the 
performance measure of EBITDA allow us to account for variations among firms’ salary 
structures. Our other performance measures include revenue growth and the change in return 
on assets (ROA), defined as EBITDA/total assets. These are more commonly use performance 
measures. 
 
4. Findings 
The percentage take up of each of the four best management practice systems by the end of 
Year 1 through Year 5 is reported in Figure 1(a). It plots the percentage of companies in the 
sample that report having adopted a system at the end of each year since buyout. One can glean 
several patterns from this information as the rate of adoption varies sizably across the sample. 
Monitoring and Targets emerge as the most widely adopted systems in Year 1 and Year 2 
across the sample of firms. Operations and Incentives are not given that much weight in these 
first two years as the adoption of these systems is much slower than the Monitoring and Targets 
systems. This trend changes in Year 4 and 5 however with the increasing adoption of 
Operations and Incentives. Figure 1(b) plots the evolution of best management practice systems 
by headcount: (i) less than 75 employees; (ii) between 75 and 150; (iii) between 150 and 250; 
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(iv) between 250 and 500; and (v) more than 500 employees. There is initially a rapid build-up 
of the best management practice systems until the size reaches 150 employees, and then again 
between sizes 250 and 500. Companies in these size categories introduce an assortment of new 
practice systems (or significantly revise them), alternating an emphasis first on Targets and 
then on Incentives. Both Figure 1 (a) and (b) provide important key information about the 
percentage take up of each of the four best management practice systems over time and the 
evolution of best management practice systems by headcount, respectively. In Figure 1(a) and 
1(b), series 1 depicts Operations; series 2 depicts Monitoring; series 3 depicts Targets; series 4 
depicts Incentives. 
 
< Insert Figure 1 about here > 
 
The sample of companies contains 27 management buyouts (MBO). A management buyout 
involves members of the incumbent management team acquiring control of the company with 
a significant equity stake (Robbie and Wright, 1996). As such, there is greater incentive for the 
MBO managers to achieve performance targets as owner managers are likely to draw on control 
mechanisms extensively to ensure implementation of new or revised growth targets. However, 
this prediction does not bear out in the data collected. Figure 2 presents information for 
management buyouts (Figure 2a) and non-management buyouts (Figure 2b). The 
implementation of best management practices in both sets of sampled firms does not vary 
significantly. In Figure 2(a) and 2(b), series 1 depicts Operations; series 2 depicts Monitoring; 
series 3 depicts Targets; series 4 depicts Incentives. 
 
< Insert Figure 2 about here > 
 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3. Except size, all other variables increase over 
time. In the first two years, size decreases; however, this trend changes in the following three 
years, a pattern conforming to buyout company strategies. To cut costs, buyouts drastically 
slash a number of company operations, reducing their labor requirements. At later stages, when 
buyout sponsors start looking toward their exit and thrust the firms into exploring new growth 
opportunities they start re-employing labor and, as a result, their size also begins to increase. 
Firms with a buyout sponsor’s representative on the board grow over time. Also those firms 
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grow where incumbent CEOs have been replaced. As the timeline of best management practice 
adoption suggests, most of the individual practices introduced early are related to targets, while 
practices about incentives are introduced later.  
 
< Insert Table 3  about here > 
Finally, Table 4 presents the correlation of the company observations in a selected number of 
categories.  
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
 
4.2 Adoption of Best Management Practices 
The adoption of best management practices is measured in terms of the time it takes to 
introduce a specific set of best management practices. The time taken into account is the period 
from the company’s buyout to the date of adoption of the practice and count the number of 
practices adopted per company in total and within each of practice set at the end of each year. 
Because the data is of discrete in nature, we use the Poisson regression model (Greene, 2000) 
to estimate the probability of observing a certain number of management practices adopted at 
a point in time. It is defined as follows: 
 
      (1) 
 
where y = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . is the number of practices adopted, xj are the independent 
variables, and βj are the coefficients for the independent variables. The various independent 
variables include best management practices and the study’s control variables. A coefficient 
on an independent variable greater (less) than 1 indicates that the explanatory variable increases 
(decreases) the probability of control system adoption. All variables are updated every year. 
The Poisson regression also controls for potential autocorrelation of error terms for 
observations from the same firm. We expect that company strategy, competition and agency 
costs, as proxied by a buyout sponsor’s board membership, will be associated with a large 
number of practices adopted. Similar associations are expected for the perceived benefits and 
costs of introducing best management practices, as proxied by the appointment of professional 
staff and a new CEO ; company size, as proxied by employee headcount and whether the LBO 
was a subsidiary. 
,
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Table 5 presents the results in the form of incidence rate ratios (℮β). As expected, the 
strongest results are about a buyout firm’s need for developing relevant targets and monitoring 
practices. In the event of a takeover, the buyout firm board is usually restructured to reflect the 
interests of new investor owners. In our results, board member has a significant positive impact 
at the overall best management practices (BMP) level, as well as at the levels of operations, 
monitoring, targets and incentives. Board members are likely to play a key role in focusing 
management attention toward specific restructuring goals, an important part of which is taking 
up of relevant management practices. The proportion of debt used in an LBO transaction is 
also significantly positively associated with best management practices, confirming the 
contention of Jensen (1989) that debt exercises discipline over company managers. The 
replacement of the incumbent by a new CEO also has significant and positive effects in every 
specification save target-related practices. As target-related practices are mostly levied at the 
behest of the buyout sponsors as soon as company changes hand, a new CEO will likely have 
less influence over the introduction of such practices. On the other hand, operations and 
incentive related practices are developed over the life of a buyout giving a new CEO an ample 
opportunity to shape the design and nature of the control process. 
 
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
 
Company size explains the decision to adopt monitoring related practices as there is a 
statistically significant association between employee headcount, the proxy for company size, 
and monitoring. Interestingly, size is not significant in target related practice model, which 
underlines the fact that considerations for the adoption of such practices in a buyout are largely 
divorced from actual employee numbers. The coefficients of professional staff (i.e., HR 
Manager, CFO, BD Manager) are positive and significant in all best management practice 
specifications, indicating that the appointment of professional staff encourages the company to 
take up a larger number of best management practices. This is also consistent with the idea that 
the adoption of best management practices in a firm is given boost by the availability of expert 
help. For example, knowledge of incentives and monitoring practices may form part of the 
professional toolkit of a human resource manager; thus, in hiring this person, companies are 
benefiting from his/her expertise in monitoring and incentive related practices. 
The findings suggest that the cost leadership is positively and significantly associated 
with target related practices, confirming the view that performance measurement emphasizing 
concrete performance targets registers heavily in a buyout’s plan to cut costs in its initial phases 
 22 
of development. On the other hand, differentiation strategy has a significant and positive 
association with operations and incentives related practices. These results suggest that different 
buyout strategies imply different best management practice adoption approaches: when 
buyouts adopt an internally focused approach, efficiency management and cost control become 
a priority. In contrast, when product-market variations are greater, incentives and operations 
become a central concern. As incentives related practices tolerate, if not encourage, 
experimentation and creativity if set appropriately, buyouts can aim to extend their market 
reach by focusing on growth and development of new product lines. Similarly, more attention 
needs to be paid to operations related practice when a firm undergoes changes in its production. 
The findings shows that the subsidiary is significant in target related regression, whereas its 
relationships with monitoring and incentives are statistically weak.  
Overall, the evidence is consistent with the explanatory variables having significant 
effects on the adoption of best management practices. Buyouts utilize almost all best 
management practices intensely, although there may be important variations in the way 
different best management practice systems are operated in relation to different strategy 
challenges. The effects of subsidiary, size and new CEO are the only variables where our 
conclusions are not robust across all specifications. 
 
4.3 Best Management Practices and Buyout Performance 
The question we want to address in this section is whether the adoption of best management 
practices has any effect on company performance and productivity as well. Past studies on the 
implementation of different forms of management systems have usually modelled adoption of 
these practices in relation to growth in employees (Hambrick, 1983). This is based on the 
assumption that as the number of employees increases firm demand for formal control systems 
also increases. However, in the present case, such a measure will give a distorted picture of the 
effect of employee size, as buyouts generally reduce employment as part of their restructuring 
programs. Therefore, the study uses growth in revenues, productivity and ROA as the company 
performance measures. Best management practices are related to operations, monitoring, 
targets and incentives, as before. Information about these measures, including revenue growth, 
productivity and ROA, were obtained through the questionnaire survey as well as various 
secondary sources, as mentioned above. 
We control for buyout sponsor’s board member, new CEO, Size, HR Manager, CFO, 
Marketing / Product Development Manager, and Subsidiary. 
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Productivity = α + β*OPERATIONS + β*MONITORING + β*TARGETS + β*INCENTIVES 
+ β*Control Variables + ε                              (2) 
 
Table 6 provides OLS (Ordinary Least Square) results for the effects of best management 
practices on buyout performance. The dependent variable for the first regression is revenue 
growth (Column 1). For the second and third regressions, the dependent variables are denoted 
by productivity (Column 2) and ROA (Column 3). 
 
< Insert Table 6 about here > 
 
For revenue growth, productivity and ROA regressions, the coefficients for all four sets 
of best management practices are positive and significant, indicating that the adoption of best 
management practices is indeed associated with improved buyout productivity and 
performance. The models’ R2’s range from 0.112 to 0.560 (p < 0.001). The relationships 
between different management practices and revenue growth are ambiguous, as the signs are 
as expected but the coefficients not significant. In addition, the regression model as a whole is 
not significant, underlining the difficulty in predicting revenue growth. As before, Size, new 
CEO, Board, CFO, HR Manager, Marketing / Product Development Manager, Cost leadership, 
Differentiation, Subsidiary and various industry sectors were included in LBO performance 
regressions. Findings also suggest that the company size, board membership, and new CEO are 
important as are different categories of professional staff in explaining the variation in 
performance outcomes. Likewise, strategy variables have significant positive impact on buyout 
performance. However, the effect of subsidiary on buyout performance is ambiguous, since it 
has opposite effects for ROA. 
 
4.4 Endogeneity 
In the empirical analysis, the hiring of professional staff (HR manager, CFO, Marketing / 
Product Development manager) is modelled as endogenous decisions. Results presented in 
Table 6 show that professional staff have positive effect on buyout firm performance. It has 
thus been argued that professional staff increase the odds for investment success. However, 
this analysis does not take into account the possibility that professional staff are valued only 
when they affect performance. To account for the endogenous relation between professional 
staff and performance, we also estimate the performance effect of professional staff with two-
stage least squares (2SLS). Table 7 provides 2SLS results, which confirm that professional 
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staff indeed raise the buyout firm performance. In fact, the results are stronger than the OLS 
regressions, especially the association between CFO and productivity. 
 
< Insert Table 7 about here > 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The paper studies best management practices within the context of a restructuring firm. 
Specifically, the empirical study traces the evolution of best management practices in leveraged 
buyout companies. Buyouts normally have a life cycle that extends from deal structuring, 
changes in company management practice, and then, finally, harvesting investment. 
Underlying these phases of investment is the application of best management practices that 
reflects the buyout sponsors’ concern for creating a re-vitalized focus on performance. Best 
management practices thus mediate the relationship between buyout investors and their 
portfolio companies. 
By treating best management practices as a tool of firm productivity growth, the present 
study explores the variation in the types of best management practices introduced by buyout 
firms. Specifically, the study finds that targets and monitoring are of a particular concern for 
buyout sponsors in the immediate aftermath of company takeover while operations and 
incentives appear to be more relevant during periods of buyout expansion involving innovative 
product market solutions. The findings also show how the varying nature of the quality of 
expert administrative support available in a firm as well as agency costs significantly influence 
the need for best management practices. In the regression results, firm size is not associated 
with targets, underlining the influence of external factors in the take up of target related 
management practices. The size variable is significant though in monitoring related models. 
The results also indicate that as buyout firms lay foundations for growth and development and 
put in place the requisite conditions for investor exit, they rely on incentives and operations 
more than targets and monitoring related practices for materializing their objectives. Further 
evidence for this trend comes from the positive associations between incentives and operations 
and professional staffs. 
The above findings provide two main conclusions regarding the application of the 
theoretical model. First, the adoption of best management practices needs to be understood in 
relation to how they evolve over time. We find specific evidence that supports the evolutionary 
and adaptive theories’ contention that practices that control and coordinate critical operational 
processes within organizations evolve over time. It is thus important to understand how 
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workplace practices within organizations first emerge and then develop along the firm’s 
evolutionary path (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004). Best management 
practices may be considered as information-based decision support mechanisms, exhibiting 
formalized and recurrent structures. As organizational routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Bagnoli and Vedovato, 2014; Centobelli et al. 2017a), they provide direction for carrying out 
activities to accomplish day-to-day operations, and thus help managers perform their functions 
efficiently and effectively. They may also leverage manager attention to diagnose ‘errors’ and 
help evaluate key decisions in the management of personnel and resources (Simons, 1994; 
Siders et al. 2001; Beersma, et. al. 2003; Durst and Wilhelm, 2012; Inkinen, 2016; Massaro et 
al., 2016). There can be a few important organizational mechanisms, such as an information-
rich knowledge management system, that confer knowledge benefits through the adoption of 
best management practices. However, these benefits are rarely directly observed and measured. 
Specific knowledge management theories such as the coordination and codification of 
knowledge stress the importance of measuring the nature of a particular management system 
(Centobelli et al. 2017b). This has now been made possible by the availability of digital and 
social media platforms that allow a large number of individuals to regularly communicate and 
share information. Moreover, a particular problem with the traditional knowledge management 
system was that employees felt resistant to knowledge sharing. The emergence of new 
production systems offer companies opportunities to listen to and engage with their employees, 
and potentially to encourage them to become long term agents of change through knowledge 
sharing and development. The current study indicates how best management practices and 
traditional knowledge management systems interact to create this new concept. It takes the 
original knowledge management concepts of knowledge sharing and show how best 
management practices incorporate such specific features to benefit an organization in terms of 
the increased levels of knowledge sharing and system informativeness. Consequently, policy 
makers can focus on encouraging the adoption of management practices that particularly 
enhance the adoption and further development of new knowledge management systems in 
small scale and medium sized firms. Best management practices thus possess information 
processing properties that provide structure to an organization’s work and lay down roadmap 
for controlled and consistent performance (Ouchi, 1979; Egeihoff, 1982; Tushman and Nadler, 
1986; Grant, 1996).  Adaptive organization framework also emphasizes the need for analysing 
the role of various firm-related change factors in how different management practices are 
introduced in the first place and what factors induce changes in them (Cyert and March, 1963; 
Dosi and Marengo, 2007; Cerchione and Esposito, 2017; Centobelli et al. 2017b). For example, 
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we find that different firm strategies are linked to different types of management practices as 
implemented by LBOs in relation to their growth trajectory. Similarly, we show that outside 
investors’ board representatives and new CEO can play an important role in introducing 
different management practices. The paper therefore argues that any theoretical perspective on 
management practices must incorporate in its analysis all those factors that are likely to 
influence the adoption of best management practices. 
The results show that best management practices are strongly positively related to 
manufacturing organizations only. One reason for these results perhaps might be that the best 
management practices examined by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) are designed primarily for 
manufacturing firms only. There is thus a potential opportunity for future research in this area 
to devise new instruments of best management practices specifically for service sector firms 
and other similar establishments. Furthermore, the findings shed light on how management 
practice related production planning and control processes can be managed more efficiently 
and effectively. For example, at what stage of a firm’s production planning and control 
processes adopt a particular type of best management practices. Moreover, there are other 
contexts in which best management practices will potentially need to be investigated such as 
mergers and acquisitions to find a better understanding of the link between management 
practices and productivity. Similarly, research into more focused management areas such as 
supply chain management could be undertaken to develop new industry related insights. 
Research in these areas may highlight other contingency factors that motivate the adoption of 
best management practices. 
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Table 1: Adaptive organizations and best management practices 
Areas where 
adaptive processes 
are likely to occur 
Information-based 
decision support 
organizational 
mechanisms 
Resource allocation 
related 
organizational 
mechanisms  
Performance 
measurement related 
organizational 
mechanisms 
Best management 
practices 
Operations related 
management 
practices  
Incentives related 
management 
practices 
Targets related 
management 
practices, including 
the type of targets, 
realism of the 
targets, the 
transparency of 
targets and the range 
and interconnection 
of targets 
 The introduction of 
lean manufacturing 
techniques 
Promotion criteria Monitoring related 
management 
practices, including 
the tracking of 
performance of 
individuals, 
reviewing 
performance and 
consequence 
management  
 The documentation 
of processes 
improvements 
Pay and bonuses  
 The rationale behind 
introductions of 
improvements 
Fixing or firing bad 
performers 
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Table 2: Sample development  
Companies in the initial database 520 
Companies that went out of business 16 
Companies acquired 72 
Companies ineligible in some other waya 49 
Companies that did not respondb 48 
Companies that declined participation 127 
Final sample of companies 208 
a: These are companies that are too old, or have trade union problems. 
b: These are companies that did not respond at all. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
BMP 
Mean 
Std. Dev 
 
0.38 
0.18 
 
0.50 
0.19 
 
0.60 
0.20 
 
0.69 
0.20 
 
0.80 
0.21 
Operationsa 
Mean 
Std. Dev 
 
0.35 
0.26 
 
0.43 
0.26 
 
0.51 
0.27 
 
0.64 
0.28 
 
0.84 
0.26 
Monitoring 
Mean 
Std. Dev 
 
0.42 
0.26 
 
0.56 
0.28 
 
0.69 
0.28 
 
0.76 
0.27 
 
0.78 
0.24 
Targets 
Mean 
Std. Dev 
 
0.44 
0.24 
 
0.65 
0.23 
 
0.75 
0.24 
 
0.77 
0.24 
 
0.71 
0.24 
Incentives 
Mean 
Std. Dev 
 
0.31 
0.28 
 
0.36 
0.28 
 
0.44 
0.26 
 
0.59 
0.27 
 
0.87 
0.26 
Size 
Mean 
Median 
Std. Dev 
 
76.30 
42 
175.45 
 
71.61 
63 
238.39 
 
197.30 
86 
220.77 
 
386.78 
120 
412.37 
 
523.85 
126 
585.65 
BOARD 
Mean 
 
0.71 
 
0.73 
 
0.73 
 
0.77 
 
0.76 
DEBT 
Mean 
 
0.66 
 
0.72 
 
0.65 
 
0.61 
 
0.54 
CEO 
Mean 
 
0.33 
 
0.35 
 
0.35 
 
0.54 
 
0.52 
CFO 
Mean 
 
0.34 
 
0.38 
 
0.25 
 
0.49 
 
0.58 
HR MANAGER 
Mean 
 
0.65 
 
0.78 
 
0.64 
 
0.53 
 
0.47 
BD MANAGER 
Mean 
 
0.17 
 
0.56 
 
0.45 
 
0.76 
 
0.58 
COMPETITION 
Mean 
 
0.65 
 
0.66 
 
0.65 
 
0.63 
 
0.63 
COST LEADERSHIP Std. Dev = 0.72 
Actual Range = -1.89-1.53 
Cronbach’s α = 0.71 
DIFFERENTIATION Std. Dev = 0.81 
Actual Range = -2.54-2.17 
Cronbach’s α  = 0.84 
SUBSIDIARY 
Mean 
 
0.23 
 
0.17 
 
0.20 
 
0.24 
 
0.27 
Productivity 
Mean 
 
34.9 
 
 
   
ROA 
Mean 
 
22.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Revenues (‘000)b 
Mean 
11,869  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry Number of 
companies 
    
Manufacturing 52     
Trade 58     
 37 
Telecommunications 26     
Health & Education 40     
IT Industry 32     
Notes: a: Operations, Monitoring, Targets and Incentive are the percentage of practices adopted over 
the maximum number of practices that can be potentially adopted. 
b: Revenues are for the last year of data available. 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 SIZE BOARD DEBT CEO CFO SUB BMP OPER MON TAR 
BOARD 0.48          
DEBT 0.17 0.65         
CEO 0.36 0.32 0.29        
CFO 0.42 0.52 0.38 0.23       
SUBSIDIARY 0.24 0.53 0.26 0.20 0.48      
BMP 0.28 0.58 0.24 0.31 0.35 0.24     
OPERATIONS 0.48 0.63 0.49 0.54 0.57 0.48 0.37    
MONITORING 0.32 0.45 0.28 0.43 0.75 0.52 0.39 0.47   
TARGETS 0.16 0.61 0.57 0.22 0.62 0.54 0.31 0.52 0.53  
INCENTIVES 0.13 0.55 0.28 0.34 0.38 0.41 0.35 0.64 0.49 0.21 
Note: Pearson correlation is reported. All correlations are significant at the 1% level. 
 39 
Table 5: Buyout adoption of BMP 
 BMP Operations Monitoring Targets Incentives 
 Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat Coeff. Z-stat 
SIZE 1.21** 0.58 0.68** 0.76 2.44*** 1.24 0.16 -0.15 1.342*** 
 
0.56 
BOARD 1.38** 2.74 1.52** 1.86 2.36*** 1.65 1.74*** 1.48 1.54** 0.64 
DEBT 1.26** 0.76 1.39*** 1.23 1.87** 1.35 1.43** 0.58 2.76*** 1.34 
CEO 1.14* 0.11 1.85*** 0.01 0.54 0.03 0.12 -0.67 1.58*** 1.13 
CFO 1.79** 2.49 1.32** 3.11 1.21** 1.18 2.27*** 1.31 1.42** 
 
0.28 
HR MANAGER 1.64** 0.22 3.65*** 1.34 3.86*** 5.06 1.16** 4.51 1.54*** 
 
1.49 
BD MANAGER 1.84* 1.31 1.12** 1.15 4.25*** 2.76 1.52** 1.82 1.53*** 
 
1.47 
COMPETITION 1.68** 
 
1.47 
 
0.31 0.50 1.65** 0.45 1.48** 1.24 1.37*** 
 
1.26 
COSTLEADERSHIP 1.03** 0.01 1.06** 0.02 0.03 0.18 3.67*** 3.31 0.01 
 
0.02 
DIFFERENTIATION 2.25** 0.82 2.28*** 0.68 0.08 0.12 0.21 -0.91 1.26*** 0.12 
SUBSIDIARY 1.03 0.17 0.82 0.14 0.04 -0.12 1.32*** 0.21 1.45*** 1.13 
Manufacturing 1.86*** 1.31 1.30*** 0.35 1.46*** 0.21 1.69*** 3.60 1.12*** 
 
1.59 
Trade 0.05 0.29 0.93 0.89 0.73 0.49 0.78 -1.60 0.86 
 
0.69 
Telecom 0.91 -0.53 0.74* -1.87 0.83 -1.25 0.80 -1.55 0.36 
 
0.70 
Health & Education 0.73 -2.17 0.94 0.60 0.90 -0.89 -1.47* 3.51 0.25 
 
1.43 
IT Industry 0.96 -0.33 0.80 -1.55 1.27 1.25 0.81 -1.79 0.02* 
 
0.54 
Note: one-tailed for SIZE, CEO, CFO, HR MANAGER, BD MANAGER, two-tailed otherwise. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05;* p < 0.1  
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Table 6: Best management practices and buyout firm performance. 
 Revenue Growth Productivity ROA 
CONSTANT 1.197* 
(0.441) 
1.691*** 
(0.559) 
0.351*** 
(1.016) 
OPERATIONS 0.003 
(0.112) 
0.531*** 
(0.455) 
0.383*** 
(0.541) 
MONITORING 0.111 
(0.143) 
1.647*** 
(0.482) 
0.372** 
(0.282) 
TARGETS 0.012* 
(1.284) 
1.536*** 
(0.338) 
1.831*** 
(0.986) 
INCENTIVES 0.023 
(0.024) 
1.363*** 
(0.571) 
1.654** 
(0.645) 
SIZE 0.219* 
(0.164) 
0.771*** 
(0.153) 
0.631*** 
(0.581) 
BOARD 0.066 
(0.162) 
0.841*** 
(0.512) 
0.536*** 
(0.432) 
DEBT 0.024 
(0.036) 
0.152*** 
(0.142) 
0.641*** 
(0.234) 
CEO 0.002 
(1.202) 
0.298*** 
(0.020) 
0.017* 
(0.033) 
HR MANAGER 0.142 
(0.101) 
0.253*** 
(0.139) 
0.109** 
(0.085) 
CFO 0.105 
(0.021) 
0.149*** 
(0.376) 
0.002 
(0.117) 
BD MANAGER 0.171 
(0.049) 
0.231 
(0.153) 
0.232** 
(0.357) 
COMPETITION 0.182** 
(0.138) 
1.451** 
(0.512) 
0.672*** 
(0.324) 
COSTLEADERSHIP 0.105 
(0.016) 
3.342*** 
(0.618) 
1.256** 
(0.781) 
DIFFERENTIATION 0.116* 
(0.218) 
2.671*** 
(0.357) 
2.341*** 
(0.873) 
SUBSIDIARY 0.005 
(0.029) 
0.231 
(0.181) 
-0.031 
(0.171) 
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 207 208 208 
P-value of F-Statistic 0.006 0.009 0.013 
R2 0.112*** 0.560*** 0.346*** 
Note: The standard errors and covariances are white heteroskedasticity-consistent. In all regressions, industry 
controls are included but not reported. (*** p < 0.01;** p < 0.05;* p < 0.1)  
 
  
 
 41 
 
Table 7: Endogeneity – Best management practices and buyout firm performance 
 Revenue Growth Productivity ROA 
Constant 
 
0.186 
(0.131) 
0.008 
(0.513) 
0.027* 
(0.930) 
OPERATIONS 0.198  
(0.160) 
1.180*** 
(0.792) 
0.691*** 
(0.530) 
MONITORING 0.058 
(0.023) 
0.147*** 
(0.134) 
0.156*** 
(0.041) 
TARGETS 0.056 
(0.164) 
0.474*** 
(0.226) 
1.277*** 
(0.612) 
INCENTIVES 0.279** 
(0.036) 
1.083*** 
(0.961) 
1.031*** 
(0.420) 
SIZE 
 
0.218 
(0.283) 
0.832*** 
(0.529) 
0.460** 
(0.434) 
BOARD 0.094 
(0.215) 
0.410*** 
(0.351) 
0.191** 
(0.133) 
DEBT 0.118 
(0.112) 
0.203** 
(0.134) 
0.774*** 
(0.678) 
CEO 0.124 
(0.221) 
0.378** 
(0.257) 
0.216*** 
(0.114) 
HR MANAGER 
 
0.186 
(0.131) 
0.212*** 
(0.161) 
0.264*** 
(0.142) 
CFO 0.203   
(0.255) 
2.955*** 
(1.175) 
0.210*** 
(0.116) 
BD MANAGER 
 
0.170 
(0.142) 
0.261** 
(0.171) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
COMPETITION 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.278*** 
(0.173) 
0.169*** 
(0.136) 
COSTLEADERSHIP 
 
0.115 
(0.109) 
0.236*** 
(0.244) 
0.233* 
(0.43) 
DIFFERENTIATION 
 
0.130 
(0.137) 
0.278*** 
(0.114) 
0.175** 
(0.085) 
SUBSIDIARY 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.163 
(0.149) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 207 208 208 
P-value of F-
Statistics 
0.011 0.007 0.011 
R2 0.118*** 0.361*** 0.589*** 
Notes: The standard errors and covariances are White heteroskedasticity-consistent. In all regressions, industry 
controls are included but not reported. (*** p < 0.01;** p < 0.05; * p< 0.1).  
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Appendix I: Interview scoring guide for management practices 
 
 
Scoring Grid 1 3 5 
Operations – 
“Process 
improvement 
documentation” 
No process 
improvements made 
when problems 
occur 
Improvements are 
made in weekly 
workshops involving 
all staff, to improve 
performance in their 
area of the plant 
Exposing problems in a 
structured way is integral to 
individuals’ responsibilities, 
and resolution occurs as a 
part of normal business 
processes rather than by 
extraordinary effort/teams 
Monitoring – “How 
is Performance 
Tracked?” 
 
Measures tracked do 
not indicate directly 
if overall business 
objectives are being 
met. Certain 
processes are not 
tracked at all 
Most key 
performance 
indicators are 
tracked formally. 
Tracking is overseen 
by senior 
management 
Performance is 
continuously tracked and 
communicated, both 
formally and informally, to 
all staff using a range of 
visual management tools 
Targets – “How 
Tough are 
Targets?” 
 
Goals are either too 
easy or impossible to 
achieve; managers 
low-ball estimate to 
ensure easy goals 
In most areas, top 
management pushes 
for aggressive goals 
based on solid 
economic rationale. 
There are a few 
“sacred cows” not 
held to the same 
rigorous standard 
Goals are genuinely 
demanding for all divisions. 
They are grounded in solid 
economic rationale 
Incentives - 
“Promoting high 
Performers” 
 
People are promoted 
primarily upon the 
basis of tenure 
People are promoted 
upon the basis of 
performance 
We actively identify, 
develop, and promote our 
top performers 
